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Network security is a major topic of research because cyber attackers pose a
threat to national security. Securing ground-space communications for NASA missions is
important because attackers could endanger mission success and human lives. This thesis
describes how an open source IPsec software package was used to create a secure and
reliable channel for ground-space communications. A cost efficient, reproducible
hardware testbed was also created to simulate ground-space communications. The testbed
enables simulation of low-bandwidth and high latency communications links to
experiment how the open source IPsec software reacts to these network constraints. Test
cases were built that allowed for validation of the testbed and the open source IPsec
software. The test cases also simulate using an IPsec connection from mission control
ground routers to points of interest in outer space. Tested open source IPsec software did
not meet all the requirements. Software changes were suggested to meet requirements.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1

Introduction
Network security has been an ongoing research area since the Internet was

invented, now that the Internet has become more incorporated into everyday systems,
terrorists and hackers pose threats to national security, governments and private
corporations. In order to protect classified and proprietary information the government
and corporations have made network security a prime objective [1]. Three basic security
needs are Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. Confidentiality in a network refers
to preserving authorized disclosure of information to unauthorized people or systems.
Integrity is the act of the network guarding against information modification or
destruction. Availability refers to the network ensuring timely and reliable access to the
information. If these three basic concepts are met then network security can provide a
network with reliable and secure means of data transmission and communication, while
also preventing eavesdroppers and malicious attackers from entering the network and
keeping them from gathering information about the traffic by obscuring the network
traffic with use of encryption.
Encryption transforms plaintext to an unreadable form, called ciphertext, using a
key. The only entities that can understand the ciphertext are the ones that obtain the key.
Encryption is a common tool used in network security. Authentication is also a common
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tool used in network security and is used to authenticate information and make sure that
the information came from the correct source.
This thesis explores the use of the network security protocol IPsec to create secure
and reliable links for space communications on manned and unmanned space missions.
IPsec uses encryption and authentication algorithms to build a secure host to host
connection where network traffic between the two hosts can be secured against network
threats.
Strongswan and Openswan are the two open source IPsec software packages that
were researched and tested during this thesis project. In order to test these software
packages and test how the IPsec protocol reacts to space conditions, a cost efficient
testbed was designed and implemented. The Openswan software was found to not meet
the requirements proposed by NASA. The secondary open source IPsec software,
Strongswan, was identified and tested against the NASA requirements. After passing the
preliminary requirements, Strongswan was chosen to be the software used during the
experiments.
The experiments first test the functionality of the testbed and make sure the
results gathered from the testbed are reliable and can be used as the baseline control
experiments without IPsec. Then the Strongswan IPsec software is tested for
functionality. The next experiments tested Strongswans reliability during extreme space
conditions, such as high packet loss and large packet delays. The Strongswan software
performed very well under most of the tests, but the testbed was unable to simulate space
delays to Mars and the Strongswan software was not able to be tested thoroughly at these
conditions.
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1.2

Overview of IPsec
IPsec is a security architecture for the Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) and

Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6). IPsec provides security mechanisms, such as
authentication and encryption of data encapsulated within IP packets, to provide
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data. IPsec is an end-to-end security scheme
that can be used to protect traffic between a pair of hosts, between a pair of security
gateways, or between a host and security gateway [2]. IPsec provides security services
right above the IP layer and can be used by higher level protocols, such as TCP and UDP.
IPsec has two different security protocols, IP Authentication Header (IPsec AH)
and IP Encapsulating Security Payload (IPsec ESP). The IPsec AH protocol provides the
IP layer with data origin authentication, which ensures that the origin of the message is
authenticated and trusted. The IPsec AH protocol also provides connectionless integrity
and an optional anti-replay service [2]. The IPsec ESP protocol provides the IP layer with
all the services provided by the AH protocol, but also provides confidentiality through
encryption of packets.
IPsec also provides two different modes of service: transport mode and tunnel
mode. Transport mode works by leaving the original IP header intact and only encrypting
and authenticating the payload of the IP packet. This means that the transport mode SA
provides security service only for the higher layer protocols and not for the IP header.
Tunnel mode works by encrypting and authenticating the entire IP packet. Tunnel mode
creates a new IP packet and new IP header, which encapsulates the old IP packet and
header. Tunnel mode is the most common mode of operation with “Bump-in-the-stack”
implementations, where IPsec is implemented between an existing IP protocol stack and
between the local network drivers.
3

IPsec makes use of two different databases to process incoming and outgoing IP
packets. The Security Policy Database (SPD) and Security Association Database (SAD)
are used locally by IPsec to store and process incoming and outgoing traffic. The SPD
holds information about which services are to be offered to IP packets and how these
services will be applied. The SPD must discriminate against IPsec traffic and traffic that
is allowed to bypass IPsec. For any packet, outgoing or incoming, the SPD must be able
to determine whether to: discard, bypass IPsec, or apply IPsec. Discard means that the
packet will not leave the host or enter the network. Bypass IPsec means that no IPsec
processing will need to be done. Applying IPsec means that the packet will be processed
by IPsec and the SPD must specify the security services to be provided, protocols to be
employed, and algorithms being used [2].
The SAD stores parameters of all the active Security Associations (SA). A
Security Association (SA) is an agreement between two network nodes on how to process
traffic between the two nodes. The SA holds information and parameters, such as
compression, encryption, and authentication algorithms being used, keys associated with
the SA, and the SPI. The SAD keeps track of all the SA’s created by the host and then
IPsec can use the database to look up information about incoming and outgoing traffic.
Security Parameter Index (SPI) is used when an outgoing or incoming packet needs to
uniquely identify an index to the SAD. IPsec uses the SPI and IP address to find the SA
in the SAD and then can use the SA parameters to either encrypt or decrypt the traffic.
IPsec uses the Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol
(ISAKMP) in order to establish, maintain, and delete security associations [5]. ISAKMP
is a protocol that utilizes security concepts from authentication, key management, and
security associations to build secure communication links with another host. The
4

ISAKMP protocol defines standard procedures and packet formats to handle and
maintain security associations. The packets formed by ISAKMP carry key negotiation
information needed by both parties that are involved in establishing the SA. The first
exchange allows for a basic set of security attributes to be established and specify which
authentication method and key exchange will be used. Then subsequent ISAKMP
exchanges will use this information for identity authentication and generating session
keys that is used by the established SA. Figure 1.1 shows the ISAKMP protocol used by
IPsec to negotiate initial parameters for the IPsec connection.

Figure 1.1

Visual Representation of the ISAKMP Protocol used by IPsec

IPsec also has a method to automatically update session keys once the session
keys have reached a timeout value, specified by the user, and the session keys need to be
renegotiated. This process helps to keep the session keys fresh and changing all the time,
which protects the channel from sniffers using brute force attacks on the session keys.
5

The method that handles the automatic renegotiation of session keys for SA’s is called
the Internet Key Exchange and referred to as IKEv1 [5].
IKEv1 implements a subset of the OAKLEY protocol [14] and the ISAKMP
protocol [5] to negotiate authenticated keying material for security associations. IKEv1
uses phases to define a state of what type of information is being negotiated. Phase 1
occurs when two peers use the ISAKMP protocol to develop a secure and authenticated
channel. Phase 1 builds an ISAKMP security association. Phase 2 occurs when a
particular service, such as IPsec, needs keying material and service negotiation [5]. Phase
2 is what creates the IPsec SA that is handled by the IPsec SAD and SPD databases.
When IPsec is setup and configured properly, it can be a very powerful network
security tool. IPsec uses encryption, authentication, and standardized protocols to build a
reliable and secure communications channel that can provide confidentiality, integrity,
and availability.
1.3

Motivation and Hypothesis
NASA space communication channels need to be secured against malicious

attacks and network eavesdropping. NASA has decided to use the IPsec protocol to
protect command and communication links on manned and unmanned space missions.
NASA has proposed some requirements that should be met by the IPsec implementation
that is used in space communications.
1. A key management protocol, IKEv1, which should be implemented by the
software. The software could also include the IKEv2 key management
protocol so that could be tested after IKEv1 was tested thoroughly.
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2. The two security protocols designed by IPsec should be implemented by
the IPsec software. This includes the ESP protocol and the AH protocol.
Since ESP provides encryption and authentication, NASA chose to use
ESP during the experiments.
3. The two modes that were standardized by IPsec and explained in the RFC
2401 should be implemented by the IPsec software. This includes
transport mode and tunnel mode. While transport mode only encrypts the
original IP payload, tunnel mode encrypts the entire original IP packet.
NASA chose to use IPsec in tunnel mode for the experiments.
4. The IPsec software package should also support multiple strong
cryptographic algorithms. The algorithm chosen by NASA was the AESGCM-256 cryptographic algorithm.
5. The IPsec software should be able to initialize an IPsec connection and
renegotiate session keys under high latency and limited bandwidth space
conditions.
6. The IPsec software should not cause any extreme packet delay or packet
loss while operating in space conditions.
NASA has previously tested IPsec in a testbed outfitted with proprietary network
equipment that implements the IPsec protocol with costly network devices that simulate
space bandwidth and space delay. During these tests, NASA found that the proprietary
network equipment that implements IPsec did not meet some of the requirements
proposed for an IPsec implementation for use in space. First the IPsec devices were
unable to renegotiate session keys under high latency channels, which resulted in an
insecure channel with unencrypted traffic or loss of data communications. Secondly the
7

simulated space bandwidth and space delay caused very high packet loss, which resulted
in the inability to renegotiate session keys and very high packet latency.
Given this problem with the proprietary IPsec software tested by NASA, this
thesis forms the following hypothesis: A cost efficient, reproducible testbed that
simulates space conditions can be developed to test open source IPsec software. Open
source IPsec software can replace the proprietary IPsec software and perform better under
simulated space conditions, such as limited bandwidth and high latency links. If a
problem arises when testing the open source IPsec software under simulated space
conditions then it is relatively easy to look at the source code of the open source software
and decide if it is feasible to change the source code to allow the IPsec software to work
in space. The testbed developed could then be used to test other network protocols, like
IPv6, in a space simulated environment. The testbed would allow researchers to build
more cost efficient environments to test network protocols and network security protocols
to provide reliable communications research to the space community.
The remainder of this thesis includes three additional chapters. Chapter 2 is a
literature review of the papers that were useful throughout the thesis project. Chapter 3
explains requirements for the testbed that will be used to test the open source IPsec
software and provides information to reproduce the testbed. Chapter 4 reviews the test
cases that were used to test the open source IPsec software. Chapter 5 is the conclusion of
thesis project.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1

Introduction
This literature survey section reviews research papers and literature that were

reviewed during the course of this research. The first section reviews the overhead
analysis and performance metrics of IPsec and IKE. The second topic that was researched
is the realistic use and testing of IPsec in space and what modifications could be made to
make IPsec more practical in space environments.
2.2

IPsec and IKE Performance Analysis
Papers that review the performance of IPsec and its counterpart IKE are useful in

determining if IPsec would be a good fit for securing space communication links. The
papers could also explain the overhead of the IPsec protocol and propose solutions to
problems arising in IPsec and IKE.
In their paper O. Elkeelany et. al. performs an analytical analysis on IPsec
authentication and encryption space complexity, computation time complexity, and
protocol limitations [3]. The paper first gives a brief overview of IPsec, describes the
modes of IPsec, and gives specific information on how IPsec encapsulates IP packets
with AH headers and ESP headers. Then the paper focuses on performing the analytical
analysis of IPsec. During the experiments IPsec was tested using DES and 3DES
encryption. Although our project used AES-GCM encryption, we still deem this
performance analysis of IPsec very interesting for our study.
9

They first analyze the space complexity of IPsec and determine how much
overhead that IPsec introduces in terms additional bytes after adding IPsec headers to IP
packets. They determined that this varies depending on the authentication algorithm
being used by IPsec and produced a table to explain how the overhead differs from IPsec
protocols being used and IPsec modes being used. Figure 2.1 shows the table from the
paper. This table shows the byte overhead IPsec introduces based on which mode and
protocol is being implemented by IPsec.
Table 2.1

Byte Overhead Produced by IPsec
IPsec AH protocol

IPsec ESP protocol

Transport Mode

24 Bytes

22 Bytes

Tunnel Mode

44 Bytes

42 Bytes

During the research of this thesis IPsec ESP was used in tunnel mode. Therefore
during the experiments IPsec was creating an additional overhead of 42 bytes per TCP
packet. Although this additional overhead does not seem to be severe, the researchers
have kept close watch during the experiments to learn how much overhead is produced
during the IPsec experiments. The overhead produced by the Strongswan software was
realized by comparing the baseline experiments that didn’t make use of IPsec and the
experiments using IPsec.
R. Perlman’s [4] paper researches the key exchange algorithm, IKE, used by
IPsec to negotiate keys and manage rekeying events. The paper proposes that the IKE
protocol is too complex to understand and specifications in the RFC make it difficult to
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implement and review. The paper recommends that the IKE protocol should be modified
in order to make the IKE protocol both easier to understand and more secure.
The IKE protocol exchange consists of two different phases. During the first
phase the protocol does mutual authentication based on the identity of a node and some
pre-shared secret, such as a public key. Phase 1 establishes a session key that can be used
to protect the remainder of the session between the nodes. Next phase 2 uses the session
key to establish a phase 2 session key to protect all the data in the phase 2 security
association [4]. The paper argues that it would be cheaper and less time consuming to set
up a security association in one exchange and proposes that the phase 2 exchange is
unnecessary.
The paper also points out that there are too many variants of the phase 1 of IKE.
There are officially eight variants of IKE, because IKE supports four types of keys (preshared secret key, old-style public key, new-style public key, and public signature key)
and two modes of exchanges (aggressive and main mode). Then the paper explains that
hiding the endpoint identifiers is important to prevent eavesdroppers from learning who is
communicating through IPsec. There are suggestions for improving each type of key
exchange and negotiating security parameters for security associations.
R. Perlman [4] shows that a lot of revisions to the IKE protocol could be done to
improve the key exchange protocol. Perhaps this reference could be useful if NASA
decides to implement a custom key exchange protocol to handle the IPsec session key
negotiations in an outer space environment. Creating a custom protocol would be very
advantageous in allowing IPsec into space communications because the space networks
have vastly different characteristics than networks on Earth.
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2.3

IPsec in Space
Papers that present material on using the IPsec protocol in space can benefit this

research by learning what tests are appropriate for the IPsec protocol. The papers can also
be beneficial to future work on this research by providing solutions to problems using
IPsec in a space environment. Since this research is using open source software, it would
be possible to make these changes to the IPsec software allowing IPsec to be deployed
into space.
M.J. Pajevski [8] explores the use of IPsec by manned space missions and some
of the obstacles that IPsec will have to overcome to be a means of securing space
communications. In order to implement IPsec in space systems the software must be
certified by the NSA and NIST security requirements to ensure proper operation and
reliability of the software. The process of certifying equipment for space readiness is a
timely process and the equipment/software will likely need repairs or upgrades for its
usage in manned or unmanned space missions. The author also explains that security
vulnerabilities in the IPsec software can stem from the multiple RFCs that define IPsec
and IKE. Since there are multiple RFCs the IPsec and IKE protocols become unclear and
very complex. Further advancement and modifications to the RFC standards would be
very helpful in deploying these systems into an outer space environment.
Another issue that the paper points out about IPsec is the way IPsec manages the
cryptographic keying material and the security associations. Currently IPsec uses IKE, an
automatic rekeying mechanism, to renegotiate session keys to help protect the integrity of
the session keys and prevent attackers from learning the session keys. The issue with
using IKE in space systems is the possibility of an IKE rekeying event to fail during a
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mission critical event where communication failure would mean disaster. Figure 2.2
shows the way IKE would rekeying an IPsec connection between two devices.

Figure 2.1

IKE between Space Systems

The author proposes to use a centralized management approach to prevent the
possibility of IKE failing during a mission critical event. The centralized management
would use a control center, placed at mission control, to push out IPsec parameters to a
pair of devices before a mission critical event. This approach would eliminate the use of
IKE to negotiate session keys and would allow IPsec to gather new session keys at times
when it is efficient for mission control. Figure 2.3 shows an illustration of the centralized
management concept.
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Figure 2.2

IPsec Management by the Control Center

The author also outlines some security vulnerabilities that could arise in
commercial IPsec software. The complexity IPsec makes it easy to for bugs to be
introduced into the software. Pajevski [4] thinks that some of the options in IPsec like the
AH protocol and transport mode could be removed from IPsec to make it simpler.
The centralized management approach proposed by Pajevski [8] would allow for
mission control to gain full control over the IPsec rekeying events. Implementing this
approach on some proprietary IPsec software, like Cisco, would be impossible but using
open source IPsec software would allow customization of the software. This approach
could be implemented on the open source IPsec software by developers at NASA to
allow for IPsec to be deployed in space.
L. Wood [10] paper presents research and experiments on a proprietary Cisco
router in low earth orbit, which implements IPv4 and IPsec, that was a payload on the
UK-DMC (Disaster and Monitoring Constellation) satellite. During this paper they
14

present experiences with IPv4, IPv6, and IPsec to transmit imagery from the remote
sensing imaging sensors and command data from ground to space communications. The
paper also shows that a testbed was built to emulate the ground to space communications
between the satellite and NASA’s Glenn space facility in Ohio. The paper unfortunately
does not go into detail about design of the testbed, but shows a photo of the finished
testbed. The paper also does not publish any experiment test cases for using IPsec and
IPv4 on the satellite. The does paper outline the importance of deploying IPv4/IPv6 and
IPsec in space, the reason being that the U.S. Department of Defense has required the use
of advanced communication technology be implemented by satellites and providing
security to the satellite communications is also a requirement. The paper concludes that
IPv4, IPv6, and IPsec have been shown to work onboard the UK-DMC satellite and
router has been shown to work just as well as its terrestrial counterparts [10]. The paper
also presents the potential for future work that involves using SNMP (Simple Network
Management Protocol) to manage space based communication assets, which would allow
ground control systems to manage the space based router.
This works shows that IPsec and IPv4 have been tested in space conditions, but
only tested at low earth orbit on remote sensing satellites. The experiments that are
conducted during this thesis test the open source IPsec software using IPv4 on use of all
types of NASA missions from communications satellites orbiting over Earth to rover
missions to Mars.
Another source that was used extensively throughout the research was the ESTL
report [13]. This report was given to us by NASA and is not a publicly available
document. The report gives details of a testbed that was built to experiment with
proprietary routers that implement IPsec. The report outlines a testing evaluation of the
15

proprietary IPsec software that includes different experiments to test the reliability of the
IPsec software. These tests include an initial test of the software under normal conditions,
a test that utilizes high latency links between the two IPsec hosts, and a test that emulates
a noisy links.
The report describes how IPsec was used during the experiments, such as what
protocols of IPsec were used, what mode IPsec was running, and what version of IKE
was being used. Some parameters of the key expiration and session expiration were also
given during the report. The report was very thorough explaining the methodology
applied during the test cases and supplied results for the individual test cases.
At the conclusion of testing the report states that the proprietary IPsec
implementation with IKE will cause packet loss, which results in loss of initial security
association setups and later rekeying attempts, if the one way latency exceeds 4.5
seconds. The report also concludes that it the bit error rate exceeds 10^-4 the IKE
handshaking process breaks down affecting the reestablishment of security associations,
which cause data communications failure because the IPsec connection cannot be
renegotiated [13].
During the research and testing of the open source IPsec software solution, the
ESTL report [13] was used extensively. Many of the settings used by IPsec in the ESTL
report were also used during the experimentation of the open source IPsec software.
Some requirements for the development of the cost efficient testbed were created by
utilizing information that was gained from the ESTL report. Although the test cases are
exactly copied from the ESTL report, the test cases can both be compared to learn how
IPsec can be used effectively in space and what type of problems might arise while using
IPsec aboard manned and unmanned NASA space missions.
16

CHAPTER III
COST EFFICIENT TESTBED FOR SPACE SIMULATIONS
3.1

Introduction
NASA has previously tested a proprietary IPsec solution and used a testbed to

experiment with the IPsec protocol in space [13]. Unfortunately NASA’s testbed was not
available during the research and recreating NASA’s testbed would be a very costly and
take an enormous amount of time and effort. To properly test the open source IPsec
software the researchers built a testbed that is cost efficient and easily recreated for
testing network protocols under space conditions. Testing the open source IPsec software
requires a network testbed that would be able to simulate outer space network conditions
and constraints. A set of requirements for the testbed was outlined to ensure functionality
and correct simulation of the constraints seen by space communications.
1. The testbed should be able to produce high latency links. This means that the
software should be able to produce simulated space delays for points of interest in
space. The testbed should be able to produce delays from 1ms – 22.0 minutes.
2. The testbed should be able to produce limited bandwidth, which reflects
bandwidths that would be available on space equipment and space communication
links. The testbed should be able to produce limited bandwidths between 9kbps
and 24 kbps.
3. The testbed should be able to capture network traffic between the two IPsec hosts
to analyze the traffic for correct functionality.
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4. The testbed should be able to produce network traffic that would be similar to
network traffic in space communications.
5. The testbed must support the open source IPsec packages that were chosen for
experimentation and must allow the NASA requirements for an IPsec
implementation to be met.
6. The testbed must be able to accurately record timestamps to report network
statistics, such as latency and network round trip time (RTT).
Figure 3.1 shows a top level diagram of the testbed. The testbed consists of three
computers that are connected to form a network. Machine 1 and Machine 3 are the host
(also client/server in TCP terms) machines that create the IPsec connection, generate the
network traffic, and renegotiate the IPsec connection. The Router machine interconnects
the two host machines and allows traffic to flow from the one host machine to another
host machine. The router node is also responsible for simulating the space delays and
capturing network traffic.

Figure 3.1

Top Level Diagram of the Network Testbed

This chapter explains the approach towards developing a testbed that can be used
to test the open source IPsec software and simulate space conditions. It also presents
details of the machines, network configuration, and software used during the testing of
the open source IPsec software.
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3.2

Testbed Software
The Linux operating system was chosen as the operating system on all the

machines because of the research advantage of easily configurable user options and the
open source IPsec software was readily available for Linux. Linux Fedora 14 was the
operating system chosen to be the Linux test environment. In addition to the operating
system, the testbed also needs software that was capable of simulating the space delay,
capturing network traffic, and generating network traffic. Netem was chosen to simulate
space delay, Wireshark was used to capture the network traffic, and custom C socket
program was written to generate network traffic.
3.2.1

Netem Software
The testbed required a piece of software that would allow the testbed to simulate

the space bandwidth and space latency. After researching DummyNet [15], a network
emulator, it seemed to be a piece of software that fit the requirements. Unfortunately after
failing to install the software on Fedora Linux, DummyNet was developed for FreeBSD
Linux and could only properly work on FreeBSD Linux because it required the firewall
configuration used by FreeBSD. Then a piece of software that was prepackaged with
Linux called Netem[11,12] was found and offered a variety of different network
emulation tools that would greatly benefit our testbed.
Netem is a network emulation tool for testing protocols by creating characteristics
of wide area networks [11]. The software can simulate the properties of wide area
networks by producing bandwidth limitations, variable delay, packet loss, packet
duplication, and reordering of packets. The three properties that were the most interesting
in this study were bandwidth limitation, delay, and packet loss. The Netem program
works by calling the Linux command tc and setting some of the options for the command.
19

Table 3.1 shows some of the different options that were useful while testing the open
source IPsec software.
Table 3.1

Table of Netem Software Commands

Command
tc qdisc add dev eth0 root delay 100ms
tc qdisc change dev eth0 root delay 10sec
tc qdisc add dev eth0 root loss 1.0%
tc qdisc add dev eth0 root corrupt 1.0%

Description
Produces 100ms delay
Changes the 100ms delay to 10 second
delay
Produces 1% packet loss
Produces 1% single bit error

Netem can also perform bandwidth shaping, which was a very desirable feature
when looking for network emulation software. Unlike devices on earth, which connect to
the Internet and browse the web at speeds of up to 1Gbps, satellites in space, rover
systems, and space shuttles have lower bandwidth restrictions. These restrictions are due
in fact to outdated equipment and/or limitations of satellite transmission medium. The
bandwidth numbers used in the project came from reference [13], the test document
provided by NASA. The test document showed results from testing the proprietary IPsec
implementation. The document published bandwidth values that were used during the
IPsec test cases. The bandwidth limitations tested during that study were 72kbps/9kBps
download speed and 192kbps/24kBps upload speed. In order to reconstruct similar test
cases for comparative reasons, the experiments in this thesis used these values during the
simulations.
Netem uses a queue-type data structure to handle bandwidth limiting
functionality. The data structure can be modified to behave like specific queuing
disciplines (qdisc). A queuing discipline is a packet queue with a specific algorithm that
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decides when to send each packet. Table 3.2 shows the commonly used queuing
disciplines.
Table 3.2

Common Queuing Disciplines

QDisc Name
pfifo_fast
TBF
SFQ
PRIO
CBQ
HTB

Description
Simple first in first out queue
Token Bucket Filter, limits the packet rate and allows shaping
Stochastic Fairness Queuing, divides packets into separate queues and
then sends packets in a round robin style
Classful QDisc that can prioritize packets
Class Based Queuing, allows traffic shaping based on classes defined
by the user
Hierarchical Token Bucket, classful QDisc similar to CBQ but easier to
work with.

Netem can be used to create a tree like structure, shown in Figure 3.2, that consist
of multiple qdisc to provide different services for specific network traffic [12]. For
example, if a TCP service needed to regulate bandwidth to a certain amount and a UDP
service needed to regulate bandwidth at a different speed from TCP, Netem could build a
tree of many qdisc to route specific traffic to the respective qdisc that has been setup.
Netem builds a tree by allowing the root qdisc to create two or more child qdisc with user
configured bandwidth shaping. A filter would then be used to forward the network traffic
to the respective child qdisc.
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Figure 3.2

Qdisc Tree Structure Created by Netem

After experimenting with Netem and the bandwidth shaping functionality in the
software, there were problems that didn’t allow the software to use the bandwidth
shaping qdisc while also injecting delay into the channel. This means that the Netem
software does not meet the testbed requirements to produce the bandwidth shaping
functionality.
To overcome this obstacle, a piece of software called Trickle [16] was used to
shape bandwidth traffic from machine 1 and machine 3. After using Trickle throughout
all the experiments, the data was gathered and analyzed. The results showed experiments
using 200ms-1500ms RTT delay that the network traffic did not experience any delay
from the limited bandwidth that should be enforced by Trickle. Trickle did not meet the
requirements to produce the correct bandwidth shaping functionality in the testbed.
In order to shape the network traffic to bandwidth requirements stated in the
NASA requirements section, the delay that is introduced by bandwidth can be calculated
by knowing the size of the packets being sent by the packet generating program and the
specific bandwidth rate. Equation 3.1 shows the calculation that can be used to determine
the amount of delay that is introduced by the bandwidth.
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(3.1)
The packet generator program sends packets that are 1500 Bytes and the
bandwidth rates are 9kBps upload and 24kBps download. By using these values a
calculation can be done to figure out the delay that the bandwidth limitations should
introduce. Table 3.4 shows these calculations based on Equation 3.1.
Table 3.3

Delay Calculation for Bandwidth Shaping Delay

Calculation

Delay

1500 Byte / 9 kBps

167 ms on Machine 1

1500 Byte / 24 kBps

62.5 ms on Machine 3

Instead of using the bandwidth shaping functionality of Netem, the testbed used
Netem to produce these delay values on machine 1 and machine 3. These delay values
simulated the bandwidth rates that are stated in the ESTL report and allow packets to be
sent every 167ms or 62.5ms depending on which machine is sending the packets. These
delay values will increase the overall RTT delay that will affect the network packets.
Using the simulated bandwidth delay values during the test cases will increase the RTT
delay by approximately 230ms.
Netem was used extensively throughout the project to simulate outer space
network conditions, such as packet delay and packet loss. The delay functionality in the
Netem software was used to simulate the bandwidth shaping needed for the test cases that
are performed on the open source IPsec software. .
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3.2.2

Packet Generator
Space communications traffic can consist of telemetry, voice, and command data

packets. This wide variety of traffic would be hard to completely reproduce without the
help of NASA supplying some the test files that were used during their experiments with
IPsec. To reproduce communications in space, software was written that simulates
network traffic between the two machines while also gathering packet statistics, such as
RTT and packet size. The software generating packets is a socket program that was
written in the C programming language. The software currently will read an 8.8MB file
filled with random strings of numbers and send 1500 Byte packets from the client to the
server.
There are two variations of the packet generator program, one is a TCP program
and the other is a UDP program. The two programs also have a client version and a server
version. The TCP client version opens a TCP socket, connects to the TCP server version
of the program, reads 1500 bytes of information from a text file, and sends a TCP packet
with the information read from the file as the payload to the TCP server version. Right
before the TCP client sends a packet, the program starts a timer. Then when the TCP
client receives a packet back from the server, the timer stops and is recorded. The timer
value is recorded to provide a summation of all the round trip times (RTT) and at the end
of the program this value is divided by the number of packets, which produces a
calculation for the average RTT. Once the TCP client program is done reading the file the
sockets are closed and the program prints out some network statistics of the packet
transfer. Figure 3.2 shows how the TCP program calculated the RTT delay. For more
information on how the software determined the RTT delay refer to Appendix A.
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Figure 3.3

TCP Representation of Calculating the RTT Packet Delay

The RTT delay was chosen over one-way latency because it gave an accurate
network metric for relative to one machine. Measuring the one way latency was much
more difficult because the clocks on the client/server machines clocks had to be
synchronized to within microseconds. Timing the one way latency proved to be
extremely harder than recording the RTT. When timing the one way latency the client
machine would record timestamp when a packet is sent. Then the server must record a
timestamp when receiving the same packet. In order for this measurement to be accurate
the client/server clocks must be synchronized. Then the server could send the received
packet timestamp back to the client, where the client could compare the two values to
calculate the one way latency.
To synchronize the two clocks, the Network Time Protocol (NTP) was used. But
the NTP service can only provide accuracy to within 10 milliseconds and providing
accuracy to within microseconds would require complex algorithms, fast LANS, and the
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NTP service running for an extending period of time before the clocks were synchronized
[20]. The one way latency value that was calculated by the client/server machines was
acceptable sometimes, but most of the calculated latencies were not accurate. Then the
RTT measurement was deemed a better measurement because it describes the bandwidth
and delay seen in the entire testbed relative to one machine.
The UDP version of the packet generator is similar to the TCP version, except it is
unable to produce any session statistics, such as round trip time (RTT), because of the
nature of the UDP protocol. The UDP protocol is a connectionless protocol and does not
connect to destination machine. The UDP version works by allowing the UDP client
program to sequentially read 1500 bytes from the text file, creates a UDP packet, and
then sends the packet without waiting for a response from the destination. The UDP
server program simply opens a UDP socket and waits for data to be sent to the socket.
During the preliminary testing of the TCP and UDP packet generator programs,
TCP was found to have a timeout value that allows the TCP program to close if the TCP
client socket does not connect to the TCP server within a reasonable amount of time. The
timeout value of TCP was discovered when a large RTT delay was injected between the
client and server machines. There were no configurable options at the socket level that
would allow the timeout value to be increased. This means that when test cases apply
extremely large RTT delays, the UDP version of the packet generator program must be
used. Figure 3.4 shows how the TCP protocol compares to the UDP protocol. It must be
made clear that the TCP protocol was tested to learn the point where TCP failed to
establish a connection and UDP was tested at a largest value that could be injected by the
testbed delay software. The TCP protocol timed out when the RTT delay was 19 seconds.
The UDP protocol was tested with the maximum delay that could be introduced by the
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testbed, which is a 274 second RTT delay (137 second one-way delay). Since UDP is a
connectionless protocol, UDP only experiences the one-way latency delay of 137
seconds.

Figure 3.4
3.2.3

TCP Protocol Timeout vs. UDP Protocol Timeout

Packet Capture Software
Capturing packets in a network is a common technique used by network/protocol

researchers and network security specialists. The packet capture software allows the user
to view packets traveling within the network and gather network packet statistics.
Wireshark and tcpdump are the most common programs used on Linux to capture packets
traveling across a network. Wireshark has a nice GUI and is very user friendly, while
tcpdump is command line driven and not as visually appealing as Wireshark. For this
reason, we chose Wireshark as the packet capture software used in the testbed. While
Wireshark was used on all the machines in the testbed, the router machine is the point of
the most interest. All the packets traveling through the testbed should be passing through
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the router and should be a central point to make sure the IPsec protocol is behaving
correctly.
3.3

Virtual Machine Testbed
When the project first started we planned to setup three individual virtual

machines on the same host machine. The three virtual machines were setup on the host
machine with open source software called Oracle VM VirtualBox. The virtual machine
setup included two machines acting as a client/server and the other machine would act as
a router to transmit traffic between the other two machines. To accomplish this
configuration, the client and server machine’s network settings were changed to attach
the virtual network adapter to an internal network called “nasanet1” and “nasanet2”,
respectively. Then the router machine’s network settings were changed to include two
virtual network adapters: one connected to “nasanet1” and the other attached to
“nasanet2”. Then the router machine was given static IP addresses for each of the
network adaptors, which would acts as a gateway for the two other machines. In order for
the router node to transmit data between the two network adaptors, a bit had to be flipped
in the /etc/sysctl.conf file named net.ipv4.ip_forward = 1. This allowed the router
machine to forward packets between the two network interfaces, which in turn allowed
the client and server machines to communicate. Then the client and server machines were
given static IP addresses and static gateway addresses pointing to the corresponding
router network adaptors. Figure 3.1 shows a visual representation of the virtual machine
testbed configuration.
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Figure 3.5

Virtual Testbed Configuration

After installing the software discussed in Section 3.2 on all the VM’s the
preliminary testing could begin. The testbed was tested for connectivity between all
machines with the use of the “ping” command. Then the Netem software was tested on
the router machine to ensure correct functionality of delays and packet loss. Then the
open source IPsec software was installed and setup correctly to encrypt and authenticate
packets between machine 1 and machine 2, as shown above in Figure 3.1.
Unfortunately during the preliminary testing of the virtual testbed there were
problems and inaccuracies collecting network packet statistics, such as latency and round
trip time, from the packet generating software. After encountering this problem,
information was found to explain the network timing setback. Virtual machines use their
host machines clock to update the VM clock and then clock drift occurs between the
multiple VM’s. The clock drift causes the clock on the VM’s to become out of sync and
because the VM doesn’t have a dedicated hardware clock it is difficult to calculate an
accurate reading of the network packet statistics [17].
3.4

Hardware Testbed
After determining that the Virtual Machine testbed would give inaccurate network

performance metrics, a real world hardware testbed was realized to produce more
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accurate packet statistics and provide more real world results. Three computers are
needed to realize the hardware testbed, which is very similar to the VM testbed. Two
machines could be the two IPsec hosts and the third machine could be used as the router
between the two machines. The router machine needs two Network Interface Cards in
order to connect to both machines and route traffic between the machines. Table 3.5
shows the more important characteristics of the computer hardware that was implemented
in the hardware testbed.
Table 3.4
Name
Machine 1
Machine 3
Router

Hardware Characteristics for Hardware Testbed
Processor
RAM
Dual Core AMD Turion
4.0 GB
TL-66 2.3 GHz
Dual Core Intel Pentium 4 1.0 GB
3.4 GHz
Dual Core AMD Athlon 3.0 1.0 GB
GHz

HDD
100.0 GB

NICs
1

75.0 GB

1

210.0 GB

2

Figure 3.6 shows the configuration of the individual computers in the hardware
testbed. The hardware testbed was configured very similar to the virtual machine testbed.
The machines were first loaded with a clean installation Linux Fedora 14. Then the
network interfaces were configured with static IP addresses and gateway addresses were
setup. Then the router was configured to forward traffic between the machines as
described in Virtual Machine testbed section above. Machine 1 and Machine 3 were then
connected with standard CAT-6 Ethernet cables to the respective network interfaces on
the router that were setup with the corresponding static gateway address. After a
successful “ping” test to determine connectivity between all the machines, all three
machines were loaded with the Netem software and Wireshark software to fulfill the
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requirements outlined for the simulation testbed. Then the both versions of the packet
generator program were installed on Machine 1 and Machine 3, shown in figure 3.6.

Figure 3.6

Hardware Testbed Configuration

The testbed setup allowed Machine 1 and Machine 3 to act as the two host
machines that would be using the IPsec software, while also using the packet generator
software as a client/server type relationship. These two machines would be generating all
the traffic and utilizing the open source IPsec software. The Router machine is able to
route IPsec traffic between the two machines and also simulate space delay and packet
loss on the outgoing network interfaces. This allows for the space simulation parameters
to be changed in a central location and not have the need to change configurations on
every machine in the testbed when a new experiment needs to be tested.
Once the preliminary testbed software was installed, the open source IPsec
software was installed. In order for the IPsec software to function properly machine 1 and
machine 2 needed a private and public key pair. The open source IPsec software provided
scripts to build the Certificate Authority, private key, and public key. The public key of
each machine would have to be distributed to each machine to a specific directory. Once
the public keys were distributed between machine 1 and machine 2, the IPsec software
could be started and the connection could be started. The IPsec software would first be
tested by using the “ping” command. While pinging machine 3 from machine 1,
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Wireshark could be used on the router machine to view the IPsec ESP packets traveling
through the testbed.
3.5

Conclusions
Building a testbed to experiment with security protocols, such as IPsec, in

simulated space conditions has been realized. First a Virtual Machine testbed was created
for the experiments, but was not acceptable due to clock drift which did not allow for
accurate network timing measurements. Then the hardware based testbed was created to
replace the VM testbed and provide accurate network performance measurements. The
hardware testbed was simple to work with and the testbed provided real world results.
The hardware testbed did face issues with the set of requirements for the space
simulation testbed and was not able to simulate a network channel to Mars or provide real
bandwidth shaping, because of the shortcomings of the Netem software. The hardware
testbed did fulfill the other testbed requirements and was able to be used throughout the
Strongswan experiments.
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CHAPTER IV
OPEN SOURCE IPSEC SOFTWARE TESTING
4.1

Introduction
Open source software is software where the source code is readily available and

the development process is accomplished by collaborative group of public developers.
The open source software is licensed to allow the change and distribution of the software.
NASA was interested in testing open source IPsec software because the proprietary IPsec
software that was previously tested did not perform to expectations. NASA first wanted
to test the Openswan IPsec software package but after some preliminary test the software
was found to be inadequate for NASA’s requirements. Then another open source IPsec
software package called Strongswan was researched and met all the requirements
provided by NASA.
This chapter explains the open source IPsec software configuration and
experiments that were completed to test the reliability of the IPsec software in simulated
space conditions.
4.2

NASA Requirements
Requirements for the IPsec software were given by the NASA collaborators. The

requirements included:
1. A key management protocol, IKEv1, which should be implemented by the
software. The software could also include the IKEv2 key management
protocol so that could be tested after IKEv1 was tested thoroughly.
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2. The two security protocols designed by IPsec should be implemented by
the IPsec software. This includes the ESP protocol and the AH protocol.
Since ESP provides encryption and authentication, NASA chose to use
ESP during the experiments.
3. The two modes that were standardized by IPsec and explained in the RFC
2401 should be implemented by the IPsec software. This includes
transport mode and tunnel mode. While transport mode only encrypts the
original IP payload, tunnel mode encrypts the entire original IP packet.
NASA chose to use IPsec in tunnel mode for the experiments.
4. The IPsec software package should also support multiple strong
cryptographic algorithms. The algorithm chosen by NASA was the AESGCM-256 cryptographic algorithm.
5. The IPsec software should be able to initialize an IPsec connection and
renegotiate session keys under high latency and limited bandwidth space
conditions.
6. The open source IPsec software should be well documented and supported
by the developers of the software.
These requirements were given to the researchers by NASA and developed during
this research after encountering problems throughout the preliminary open source IPsec
software research. The ESTL report [13] also stated some of the requirements for testing
an open source IPsec software package in space and those requirements were used during
these research experiments.
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4.3

Open Source IPsec Software
Recommended by NASA, Openswan [18] was the first open source IPsec

software tested and researched; however, after some preliminary testing, Openswan did
not meet all of the NASA requirements. Although support for AES-GCM-256 in
Openswan was documented, the documentation for how to use the AES-GCM-256 was
not available. The developers for Openswan were contacted through the Openswan users
list to learn how to use AES-GCM-256, but the developers did not respond and failed to
support any questions about Openswan. .
Then Strongswan open source IPsec software was identified and researched. The
Strongswan software had a very resourceful website with documents showing how to get
started using Strongswan and documentation for the various cryptographic algorithms
that Strongswan suppports. AES-GCM-256 was supported by Strongswan and it was very
easy to implement the AES-GCM algorithm, required by NASA, into a connection
configuration.
Openswan and Strongswan are very similar software packages and the software
packages are actually based on a prior open source IPsec software package called
FreeSwan. Both Openswan and Strongswan use code that was written by developers of
FreeSwan, but have since been customized by their respective community of developers.
Strongswan has a configuration file that users specify IPsec connections and
apply user configurable options to that IPsec connection. Figure 4.1 is an example of how
the configuration file is structured and the parameters that can be changed to
accommodate the network and situation where IPsec is going to be used. The most
important parameters are listed below in Table 4.1. These parameters are the most
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relevant to the meet the requirements stated by NASA and researching how Strongswan
works in a simulated space environment.
Table 4.1
Parameter
type
keyexchange
ike
esp
ikelifetime
lifetime
margintime
rekeyfuzz
keyingtries

Useful Parameters in Strongswan IPsec configuration file
Definition
Determines which mode IPsec will run
Determines which key exchange protocol will be used, IKEv1 or
IKEv2
Determines which cryptographic algorithm and hash algorithm will
be used during the IKE exchanges
Determines which cryptographic algorithm and hash algorithm will
be used during the transmission of IPsec ESP packets
Determines how long the keying channel of a connection (ISAKMP
or IKE SA) should last before being renegotiated
Determines how long a particular instance of a connection (a set of
encryption/authentication keys for user packets) should last
Determines how long before the connection expires to start a
renegotiation exchange
Determines percentage by which margintime should be randomly
increased to randomize the rekeying intervals.
Determines how many attempts should be made to negotiate a
connection
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Figure 4.1

Strongswan IPsec Configuration File

Figure 4.1 also shows the configuration file that was used in during the
Strongswan experiments. The Strongswan open source IPsec software uses the ESP
protocol in tunnel mode in all the experiments. The ikelifetime and lifetime parameters,
which control the timeout of the session keys, were set very low to allow many rekeying
events to occur during the experiments to study how the Strongswan software responds to
the rekeying events at simulated space delays. The file also shows that the experiments
used the IKEv1 key exchange protocol, as proposed by NASA. The IKE parameter
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configures the encryption algorithm, AES-256, used during the ISAKMP protocol and
IKE protocol exchanges. The AES-GCM encryption algorithm cannot be used in the IKE
exchanges because it is not approved for IKE phase 1 negotiations [7]. Although AESGCM is not approved for IKE negotiations, the IPsec connection should use an
encryption algorithm as strong as AES-GCM [7]. The ESP parameter shows that IPsec
uses the AES-GCM-256 encryption algorithm and the SHA-512 hash algorithm during
the transfer of data packets.
4.4

Experiment Preliminaries and Procedures
This section explains how the experiments were executed and what problems

arose while testing the Strongswan software. The experiments also need a standard
procedure to follow to keep the results from becoming obscured or unusable during the
research of the Strongswan software. The results from different test cases will be
compared to determine the effect IPsec has on a network and the overhead introduced by
the Strongswan IPsec software.
Before the experiments were started, Wireshark would be started on the router
machine to capture packets to learn if there were packet errors and confirm the IPsec
software was working. If inspection of packets was needed on the client/server machines,
Wireshark could also be started before or during transmission. Next if delay was being
added to the channel, then the router machine would be used to add the delay. For
example if the experiment needed to introduce 100ms of RTT delay, then the router
would put 50ms delay on one network interface and 50ms on the other network interface.
If Strongswan IPsec was being used during the experiment, then Strongswan was started
and then the IPsec connection was started. These tasks would be accomplished by
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commands provided by the Strongswan software package and were used on the command
line in Linux. The commands were sudo ipsec start and sudo ipsec up nasatest.
Next the packet generator program was started. There are two versions of the
program: the server and the client. This was also accomplished via the command line.
The server version was started first using the command sudo ./file_server. The client
version was then started using the command sudo ./file_client 192.168.3.10 file_name.txt.
4.5

Test Case 1
Test Case 1 is a control experiment to gather data from testbed while there is no

IPsec connection. During this test bandwidth shaping and error injection features are
disabled. This test provides baseline network statistics from the testbed when using only
TCP connections. These statistics are used for comparison to statistics gathered during
the future test cases that will implement IPsec. The comparisons can reveal how IPsec
can produce additional network overhead. The test starts by adding zero delay between
the two machines and then running the packet generator program. After that phase is
complete the test increases the delay value by to 100ms (200ms, 500ms, 1500ms). These
delay values are arbitrary and are for learning how the testbed and packet generator
program react to increasing delay values.
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4.5.1

Test Case 1 Results

Table 4.2

Test Case 1 Results

0ms RTT Delay

Average RTT

Packets Sent

Packets Loss

Test Run 1 – 10/26/11

0.603 ms

6163

0

Test Run 2 – 10/26/11

0.6063ms

6163

0

Test Run 3 – 10/26/11

0.6067ms

6163

0

Test Run 1 – 10/26/11

100.67ms

6163

0

Test Run 2 – 10/31/11

100.66ms

6163

0

Test Run 3 – 10/26/11

100.67ms

6163

0

Test Run 1 – 10/26/11

200.69ms

6163

0

Test Run 2 – 10/31/11

200.68ms

6163

0

Test Run 3 – 10/31/11

200.63ms

6163

0

Test Run 1 – 11/3/11

500.66ms

6163

0

Test Run 2 – 11/4/11

500.656ms

6163

0

Test Run 3 – 12/14/11

500.655ms

6163

0

Test Run 1 – 10/26/11

1.50083 seconds

6163

0

Test Run 2 – 12/14/11

1.50079 seconds

6163

0

Test Run 3 – 12/15/11

1.50093 seconds

6163

0

100ms RTT Delay

200ms RTT Delay

500ms RTT Delay

1500ms RTT Delay

4.5.2

Test Case 1 Conclusions
The results in Table 4.2 show that the testbed and packet generator were used

successfully and performed as expected. The results show that the Netem software
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performed its duties by creating the RTT delays between the two machines. The tests also
show that the network statistics were correctly calculated by the packet generator
program when compared the RTT delay introduced by Netem. Test Case 1 validates the
testbed that is used throughout the research of the Strongswan software.
4.6

Test Case 2
Test case 2 is an extension of test case 1, by adding bandwidth shaping delays into

the experiments. This test helps prove the validity of our calculated bandwidth shaping
delays that will be introduced by machine 1 (167ms) and machine 2 (62.5ms). During this
the error injection features of Netem are disabled by the router. This test utilizes the
router and Netem software to produce increasing RTT. The addition of the bandwidth
shaping delays should make the RTT delays longer than the results from test case 1.
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4.6.1

Test Case 2 Results

Table 4.3

Test Case 2 Results

0ms RTT Delay
Test Run 1 – 2/6/12

230.445 ms

6163

0

Test Run 2 – 2/6/12

230.527 ms

6163

0

Test Run 3 - 2/6/12

230.496 ms

6163

0

Test Run 1 – 2/6/12

330.373 ms

6163

0

Test Run 2 – 2/6/12

330.356 ms

6163

0

Test Run 3 - 2/6/12

330.321 ms

6163

0

Test Run 1 – 2/6/12

430.399 ms

6163

0

Test Run 2 – 2/6/12

430.433 ms

6163

0

Test Run 3 – 2/6/12

430.380 ms

6163

0

Test Run 1 – 2/6/12

730.369 ms

6163

0

Test Run 2 – 2/6/12

730.412 ms

6163

0

Test Run 3 – 2/6/12

730.379 ms

6163

0

Test Run 1 – 2/6/12

1.730342 sec

6163

0

Test Run 2 – 2/7/12

1.730367 sec

6163

0

Test Run 3 – 2/7/12

1.730354 sec

6163

0

100ms RTT Delay

200ms RTT Delay

500ms RTT Delay

1500ms RTT Delay

4.6.2

Test Case 2 Conclusions
This test proves that the bandwidth shaping delays from the client and server

machines add the calculated amount of delay (230ms) to the RTT delay that is introduced
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by the router machine. The RTT calculated by the packet generator program shows that
the packets generated are delayed by the bandwidth shaping delay (230ms) and the RTT
delay. The results show that the RTT delay and bandwidth delay don’t cause any unseen
problems with the testbed software or create any packet errors within the network.
4.7

Test Case 3
Test case 3 is the first experiment with the Strongswan IPsec software. This test

case is very similar to test case 1, but is utilizing the Strongswan IPsec software to secure
the channel between machine 1 and machine 3 shown in Figure 3.2. During this test case,
the bandwidth shaping delays and error injection features are disabled. The first phase of
the experiment there is no delay introduced by the router, but then the delay will be
gradually increased just as it increased in test case 1. After the data is gathered from this
test case the results can be compared to test case 1 to learn how much overhead the
Strongswan IPsec software introduces into the network.
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4.7.1

Test Case 3 Results

Table 4.4

Test Case 3 Results
# of SPI

Packets Sent

Packets Loss

Test Run 1 – 10/27/11 0.809ms

2

6163

0

Test Run 2 - 11/15/11

1.013ms

2

6163

0

Test Run 3 - 11/15/11

1.01ms

2

6163

0

Test Run 1 – 10/27/11 100.88ms

12

6163

0

Test Run 2 - 11/15/11

101.06ms

14

6163

0

Test Run 3 - 11/15/11

101.07ms

14

6163

0

Test Run 1 – 10/27/11 201.07ms

24

6163

0

Test Run 2 - 11/15/11

201.07ms

24

6163

0

Test Run 3 - 12/13/11

201.054 ms

22

6163

0

Test Run 1 - 11/15/11

501.09ms

54

6163

0

Test Run 2 - 11/15/11

501.08ms

54

6163

0

Test Run 3 – 12/16/11 501.10 ms

54

6163

0

1.50101 sec

154

6163

0

Test Run 2 – 12/15/11 1.50108 sec

154

6163

0

Test Run 3 – 12/16/11 1.50105 sec

154

6163

0

0ms RTT Delay

Average RTT

100ms RTT Delay

200ms RTT Delay

500ms RTT Delay

1500ms RTT Delay
Test Run 1 - 11/16/11

4.7.2

Test Case 3 Conclusions
This test case shows that the IPsec software is operational and can maintain the

functionality of the software under RTT delays from 0ms-1500ms. The results also show
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the number of Security Parameter Indexes (SPIs) that were created while the packet
generator program completed the file transfer. The SPI is an indication of how many
security associations were created between machine 1 and machine 3. This test shows
that there were many rekeying events that directly correlate with RTT delay that is
introduced by the router machine. This test is sufficient for testing the rekeying
mechanism in the Strongswan software. The test also shows that the Strongswan software
doesn’t produce any packet errors on the network. In comparison to the case 1 there is a
slight increase in the Average RTT when the Strongswan IPsec software is used to create
a secure connection between the two machines. This increase in network overhead is not
significant, but should not be overlooked.
4.8

Test Case 4
Test case 4 experiments with the Strongswan IPsec software while also using

bandwidth shaping delays on machine 1 and machine 2. This test simulates space delays
and bandwidth limitations to learn how the Strongswan software will react to simulated
space conditions. The bandwidth limitations of 9kBps and 24kBps are achieved by using
the Netem software to introduce delays by the respective machines. During this test the
error injection feature of the router will be disabled.
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4.8.1

Test Case 4 Results

Table 4.5

Test Case 4 Results

0ms RTT Delay

Average RTT

# of SPI

Packets Sent

Packets Loss

Test Run 1 – 2/7/12

230.613 ms

25

6163

0

Test Run 2 – 2/13/12

230.629 ms

25

6163

0

Test Run 3 – 2/13/12

230.624 ms

26

6163

0

Test Run 1 – 2/13/12

330.649 ms

35

6163

0

Test Run 2 – 2/13/12

330.650 ms

35

6163

0

Test Run 3 – 2/13/12

330.650 ms

35

6163

0

Test Run 1 – 2/7/12

430.677 ms

45

6163

0

Test Run 2 – 2/14/12

430.658 ms

45

6163

0

Test Run 3 – 2/14/12

430.669 ms

45

6163

0

Test Run 1 – 2/8/12

730.681 ms

77

6163

0

Test Run 2 – 2/14/12

730.670 ms

77

6163

0

Test Run 3 – 2/14/12

730.679 ms

77

6163

0

Test Run 1 – 2/7/12

1.730565 sec

178

6163

0

Test Run 2 – 2/13/12

1.730568 sec

177

6163

0

Test Run 3 – 2/18/12

1.7305791 sec

177

6163

0

100ms RTT Delay

200ms RTT Delay

500ms RTT Delay

1500ms RTT Delay

4.8.2

Test Case 4 Conclusions
This test concludes that the delay used to simulate the bandwidth limitation is

being correctly injected into the network channel. The results also show that the
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Strongswan software performs well during the bandwidth limitation delays and the
increasing RTT delays. In comparison to test case 2, the results show there is a slight
increase in the Average RTT of the network packets when the Strongswan IPsec software
is used to create secure connection between the two machines transferring packets. The
test shows that the Strongswan software does not produce any packet errors while the
packet generator program is running.
4.9

Test Case 5
Test case 5 is an experiment with error prone network links to learn how the

Strongswan IPsec software reacts to packet errors. This test uses the bandwidth delay
values from test case 2 and test case 4 to introduce some delay into the testbed to allow
for multiple IPsec rekeying events and the packet errors to affect the renegotiation
messages.
This experiment simulates RF/wireless links used in space communications. The
integrity of these wireless links can be affected by RF interference that can cause packet
errors during the transmission of network packets. To simulate the wireless medium, the
router node intentionally creates packet errors during the transmission of packets.
The error rate starts at 1.0 percent and increased gradually to 20.0 percent. The
error rates were chosen so that during the handshake messages of the ISAKMP rekeying
protocol that the rekeying messages would have a greater probability of having errors and
would have to retransmit. For example an error rate of 20% would mean that one out of
five packets would be corrupted. The ISAKMP protocol has a total of nine packets
exchanged before new keying material is available. The 20% error rate would mean that
either one or two rekeying packets would be affected. The errors will also affect the TCP
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packets from the packet generator. The gradually increasing error rates allow for
investigation of how the errors of the ISAKMP packets and TCP packets will affect the
Average RTT.
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4.9.1

Test Case 5 Results

Table 4.6

Test Case 5 Results
# of SPI

Packets Sent

Packets Errors

Test Run 1 – 2/15/12 257.219 ms

37

6163

102

Test Run 2 - 2/16/12 244.973 ms

23

6163

20

Test Run 3 - 2/16/12 248.978 ms

37

6163

28

Test Run 1 – 2/15/12 251.260 ms

34

6183

382

Test Run 2 - 2/17/12 248.527 ms

35

6183

131

Test Run 3 - 2/20/12 253.170 ms

27

6163

156

Test Run 1 – 2/15/12 307.982 ms

33

6163

492

Test Run 2 - 12/20/12 312.295 ms

45

6163

284

Test Run 3 - 2/20/12 286.710 ms

29

6163

305

Test Run 1 – 2/16/12 363.062 ms

42

6163

467

Test Run 2 – 2/20/12 416.287 ms

60

6163

707

Test Run 3 - 2/20/12 373.187 ms

38

6163

954

Test Run 1 – 2/16/12 589.907 ms

83

6163

782

Test Run 2 - 2/16/12 789.739 ms

109

6163

853

Test Run 3 - 2/20/12 623.206 ms

96

6163

821

1% packet error

Average RTT

5% packet error

10% packet error

15% packet error

20% packet error

4.9.2

Test Case 5 Conclusions
This test concludes that the Netem software used to generate packet errors works

properly. Wireshark was used to capture packets during the experiment and then after the
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experiment was complete the traffic was analyzed to determine how many packets had
errors. The results show variations in the number of packets that had errors, but this could
be attributed to one bit errors that could be corrected by the TCP error correcting codes.
This test also shows that packet errors can affect the stability of the Strongswan
software. The results prove that packet errors can affect the rekeying messages of the
IPsec software to become corrupted, which increases the amount of security associations
that need to be built and increases the latency/RTT of the messages. Packet errors directly
affected the Average RTT, but didn’t necessarily affect the amount of SA’s that were
created unless the packet errors were in the rekeying messages produced by Strongswan.
If a rekeying message had packet errors then there would be a larger amount of SA’s,
because once an error is found during the handshake of the renegotiation phase then the
phase must restart until the handshake is packet error free.
Although the rekeying mechanism of the Strongswan software was severely
influenced by the packet error experiments, the Strongswan software was able to
maintain security associations and accomplish the task of encrypting and authenticating
all the packets. Both the Strongswan IPsec software and packet generator program never
failed during these tests.
4.10 Test Case 6
Test case 6 is an experiment that introduces high latency links into the testbed that
emulates real world space communication delays. The Strongswan IPsec software is
pushed to the limits by using very high latency links between machine 1 and machine 3.
This experiment needed to provide real world space delays so NASA could
compare results of space communication with IPsec and without IPsec being used on the
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network. Some calculations were done to find space delay to some interesting points in
space, such as GPS satellites, the Moon, and even Mars. By researching the distances to
these points in space and then knowing the speed of light, an approximation of the space
delay could be calculated as shown by Figure 4.2. Since the Earth and other objects in
space have an elliptical orbit around the Sun there are different points in time when the
objects are close together and far apart. This test is using the worst case scenarios of the
objects being farther apart, with the exception being Mars. Figure 4.2 shows the
calculations that determined the space delay introduced by the distance between the Earth
and these points of interests.
After determining the space delays to the GPS satellites and Communications
Satellites, it seems that these points of interest were already covered and tested in Test
Case 3 and Test Case 4, when IPsec was used and delay was gradually increased from
0ms-1500ms. Test Case 6 focuses on using delays from Figure 4.2 to determine if IPsec
can be used in missions to the Moon, Satellites sent to the Lagrange Point, and rover
missions to Mars.
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Figure 4.2

Space Delay Calculation Spreadsheet

The first high latency link to be tested was 3000ms, which is slightly larger than
the space delay introduced by going to the Moon, but it should be representative because
when the moon is farthest away from the Earth the one way latency is 1353ms, which
means the RTT would be 2706ms that also left room for the 230ms bandwidth shaping
delays that were used in throughout the previous experiments. Next the experiment
gradually increases the delay to the Lagrange Point, to learn if the Strongswan software
could keep working. Figure 4.2 shows that the Lagrange Point one way space latency
would be 5003ms, which means that the RTT should be 10006ms. When using an RTT
delay of 10006, the experiment also uses the bandwidth shaping delays that were used in
Test Case 2 and Test Case 4.
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The next experiment was to learn if the Strongswan software and testbed could
handle simulating space delays introduced by traveling to Mars. The closest Mars will
ever get to Earth introduces a 182 second one way latency, which means that the RTT
would be equal to 364 seconds.
During this experiment we test the Strongswan’s ability to secure a
communication channel at real world space delay values.
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4.10.1 Test Case 6 Results
Table 4.7

Test Case 6 Results

Average RTT
3000ms RTT Delay
(Moon Simulation)
Test Run 1 – 11/28/11 3.001127 sec

# of SPI

Packets Sent

Packets Loss

298

6163

0

Test Run 2 - 11/15/11

3.001107 sec

298

6163

0

Test Run 3 - 12/12/11

3.001140 sec

298

6163

0

Test Run 1 – 11/28/11 4.001334 sec

388

6163

0

Test Run 2 – 12/7/11

4.001323 sec

390

6163

0

Test Run 3 - 12/10/11

4.001345 sec

390

6163

0

Test Run 1 – 10/27/11 5.501437 sec

510

6163

0

Test Run 2 - 12/7/11

5.501429 sec

510

6163

0

Test Run 3 - 11/8/11

5.501428 sec

508

6163

0

Test Run 1 – 11/27/11 7.002831 sec

624

6163

0

Test Run 2 - 11/28/11

7.002749 sec

624

6163

0

Test Run 3 – 12/3/11

7.002725 sec

624

6163

0

10006ms RTT Delay
(Lagrange Point
Simulation)
Test Run 1 – 2/8/12

10.25781 sec

1344

6163

0

Test Run 2 – 2/9/12

10.23712 sec

27*

6163

0

Test Run 3 – 2/21/12

10.25705 sec

1355

6163

0

4000ms RTT Delay

5500ms RTT Delay

7000ms RTT Delay

*denotes that default keying parameters were used seen commented out in Figure 4.1
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4.10.2 Test Case 6 Concerns –Mars Space Flight
During the testing of Test Case 6, the researchers found that the Netem software
could not provide the delay needed to simulate network traffic to and from Mars. The
upper bound of the delay that could be injected into the testbed was determined to be 137
second one way delay, allowing for a total of 274 second RTT delay. This value was not
close enough to simulate traffic to Mars, but would serve a purpose for testing the
Strongswan software.
By using the upper limit delay of the Netem software, the testbed could
experiment how the Strongswan software would perform at higher delay values and
understand if the software would be feasible to test at delay values that correctly simulate
network delays to Mars. Unfortunately when a test using the 137 second one way latency
(274 second RTT) the TCP protocol would not allow the TCP packet generator program
to connect because of the high delay value and a timeout mechanism in TCP. Once this
problem was found, a UDP version (described in section 3.2.2) of the packet generator
program was written that could be used to transfer packets over the UDP protocol. The
next phase was to use the Strongswan IPsec software to initially negotiate an IPsec
connection between machine 1 and machine 3. Strongswan was not able to negotiate an
IPsec connection because the RTT delay was larger than the software could handle.
After finding this problem, we worked back to finding out the upper limit of delay
that the Strongswan software could handle. Strongswan was found to work at a one way
latency of 35 seconds (70 second RTT). When the RTT delay value was increased, the
Strongswan software was unable to negotiate the initial IPsec connection and failed to
encrypt/authenticate network traffic. The Strongswan software uses the rekeying
daemons for rekeying session keys. Pluto is the IKEv1 rekeying process and Charon is
55

the IKEv2 rekeying process. The research uses open source software where the source
code for software was readily available for customization. This means that when a
problem is identified, a solution can be to change the software allowing the problem to be
solved. After searching through the Strongswan source code, a file was found named
constants.h in the directory named strongswan 4.5.3/src/Pluto/. The file had two timeout
variables that were used for timing the initial keying and rekeying messages of the IPsec
connection. The variable names, original values, and custom values are shown in table
4.8.
Table 4.8

Table of Strongswan Software Changes

Variable

Original Value Custom Value

EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0

10s

180s

MAXIMUM_RETRANSMISSIONS

2

5

Then when the custom values were inserted into the source code and the software
was recompiled, the Strongswan software was able to negotiate the IPsec connection with
a one way latency of up to 80 seconds (160 second RTT). Figure 4.3 shows a graph
displaying the timeout value of the original software versus the timeout value of the
customized software. If the RTT delay is set any higher than 160 seconds, Strongswan is
unable to negotiate the IPsec connection and unable to handle any higher delay values.
This may be in part to another software related event that can be customized in the
Strongswan source code.
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Figure 4.3

Original Strongswan Timeout versus Customized Strongswan Timeout

4.10.3 Test Case 6 Conclusions
In conclusion of this experiment the Strongswan IPsec software was able to
perform under the high latency conditions and successfully provide the encryption and
authentication services of IPsec. Although the testbed failed to simulate an IPsec
connection to Mars, the other data gathered is useful by showing that the Strongswan
software is a very reliable IPsec package for Linux and can be used in outer space
environments where conditions are unlike terrestrial networks.
During this test case, problems arose in the hardware testbed while trying to
simulate a space link to Mars. In lieu of that problem we were able to successively test
Strongswan software to find the maximum amount of RTT delay that Strongswan could
handle. After finding this maximum value, Strongswan source code was found that
enabled the customization of the Strongswan software. Customization of the Strongswan
source code was implemented and the IPsec software was able to negotiate IPsec
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connections at a higher maximum RTT values. This test case also shows that source code
of the open source software can be customized to work during different situations.
4.11 Testing Conclusions
After completing the test cases developed for testing Strongswan open source
IPsec software, the software performed well under limited bandwidth and high latency
links. The Strongswan software outperformed the proprietary IPsec implementation
presented in the ESTL report [13] The ESTL report states that the proprietary IPsec
software was seriously affected when a 4.5 second one way latency was introduced by
the testbed. During these experiments, Strongswan was able to encounter a 5.003 second
one way latency without being seriously affected.
The ESTL report also states that during the noisy link test case that produced
packet errors, that the proprietary IPsec software would totally shutdown after
encountering bit error rates equal to 10^-3. Strongswan was able to handle up to a 20%
packet error without the IPsec software completely failing and Strongswan was able to
successfully negotiate new security associations and session keys.
In conclusion the Strongswan was able to outperform the proprietary IPsec
implementation tested by NASA in the ESTL report and successfully complete rekeying
events that allowed the IPsec connection to become a reliable means of secure space
communication.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
Network security has become an integral part of computer networks, especially
government and private business networks that require security against eavesdroppers
and active attackers. NASA has also become interested in securing computer networks
that communicate with space based assets, such as satellites, telescopes, and rover
missions. Reliable, secure communication between ground and space based assets is
crucial for mission success. In the realm of recent network security events the
Department of Defense and National Security Agency is encouraging NASA to secure
digital communication links between mission control and space based assets.
IPsec has been a common choice in securing terrestrial networks by creating
virtual private networks and should be a logical choice to secure IP based networks in
space. IPsec provides encryption and authentication services to the IP layer of the
protocol stack. Then these services can be used to create an extremely secure connection
between two IPsec hosts.
NASA previously tested proprietary IPsec software in a simulated space
environment and the IPsec software did not meet NASA requirements. The requirements
for an IPsec software solution is presented below. Table 5.1 shows the requirements
stated in this section and described how Strongswan open source IPsec software met
these requirements during the experiments of this thesis.
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1. A key management protocol, IKEv1, which should be implemented by the
software. The software could also include the IKEv2 key management
protocol so that could be tested after IKEv1 was tested thoroughly.
2. The two security protocols designed by IPsec should be implemented by
the IPsec software. This includes the ESP protocol and the AH protocol.
Since ESP provides encryption and authentication, NASA chose to use
ESP during the experiments.
3. The two modes that were standardized by IPsec and explained in the RFC
2401 should be implemented by the IPsec software. This includes
transport mode and tunnel mode. While transport mode only encrypts the
original IP payload, tunnel mode encrypts the entire original IP packet.
NASA chose to use IPsec in tunnel mode for the experiments.
4. The IPsec software package should also support multiple strong
cryptographic algorithms. The algorithm chosen by NASA was the AESGCM-256 cryptographic algorithm.
5. The IPsec software should be able to initialize an IPsec connection and
renegotiate session keys under high latency and limited bandwidth space
conditions.
6. The open source IPsec software should be well documented and supported
by the developers of the software.
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Table 5.1

Open Source IPsec Software Requirements Checklist

Requirement

Requirement Met

1. IKEv1 and IKEv2 supported

Yes

2. AH and ESP supported

Yes

3. Transport and Tunnel Mode supported

Yes

4. AES-GCM-256 Supported

Successful and many others supported

5. High Latency and Bandwidth

Yes, up to 160s RTT with code changes

6. Software Support

Yes

To meet these requirements proposed by NASA, an open source IPsec software
package called Strongswan was tested under simulated space conditions. Testing the
Strongswan software under simulated space conditions permitted learning how an open
source IPsec software would react to low bandwidth and high latency space links.
In order to test the Strongswan software, a testbed was developed to simulate the
space conditions. The research also presented a set of requirements for the building a
testing environment for researching how communication protocols react in space
conditions. The requirements are stated below. Table 5.2 describes the requirements for
the hardware testbed and shows how well the implementation worked during this thesis
project.
1. The testbed should be able to produce high latency links. This means that the
software should be able to produce simulated space delays for points of interest in
space. The testbed should be able to produce delays from 1ms – 22.0 minutes.
2. The testbed should be able to produce limited bandwidth, which reflects
bandwidths that would be available on space equipment and space communication
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links. The testbed should be able to produce limited bandwidths between 9kbps
and 24 kbps.
3. The testbed should be able to capture network traffic between the two IPsec hosts
to analyze the traffic for correct functionality.
4. The testbed should be able to produce network traffic that would be similar to
network traffic in space communications.
5. The testbed must support the open source IPsec packages that were chosen for
experimentation and must allow the NASA requirements for an IPsec
implementation to be upheld.
6. The testbed must be able to accurately record timestamps to report network
statistics, such as latency and network round trip time (RTT).
Table 5.2

Testbed Requirements Checklist

Requirement

Requirement Met

1. High Latency Links

Yes, Up to 274s RTT (137s Latency)

2. Bandwidth Shaped Links

Yes, With Simulated Delays

3. Capture Network Traffic

Successful

4. Generate Network Traffic

Successful

5. IPsec Support

Successful

6. Record Network Statistics

Successful

This thesis presents research on developing a testbed for investigation of using
terrestrial protocols in a space environment. The thesis also explores the use of an open
source IPsec solution to secure space and mission control communications.
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5.1

Contributions
The research in this thesis shows that a cost efficient hardware testbed can be

developed to test data communication protocols in a simulated space environment. This
knowledge could be used by NASA and researchers alike to build a testing environment
in a quick, simple, and cost effective manner. The testbed could then be utilized to test
communication protocols, such as IPsec, IPv4, and IPv6, for use on a manned or
unmanned space mission.
The research that was conducted by this thesis also shows that proprietary
network instrumentation could be replaced by open source software solutions that could
reduce the cost of equipment and allow for customization of the software for explicit use
by NASA space missions. The Openswan open source software suggested by NASA did
not meet all the requirements of an IPsec solution in space based networks. Openswan
was not well documented or supported by the developers of the software. The
Strongswan open source IPsec software was identified by the research. The Strongswan
software was tested with multiple experiments and the test results were compared
between the proprietary IPsec software. The Strongswan open source IPsec software
exceeded the expectations and performed better than the proprietary counterparts, with
the ability to negotiate keys and session keys during high latency space conditions and
while packet errors were injected into the communications channel.
5.2

Future Work
While researching and testing the open source IPsec software, NASA mentioned

the need of the IPsec software to support pre-generated third party keys. NASA has to
comply with the Department of Defense and National Security Agency requirements for
cryptographic keying material and the keys that are used by IPsec must comply with
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these requirements. In order to meet these requirements, NASA wants to either customize
the open source IPsec software or investigate some other software that would be able to
negotiate the pre-shared keys that would normally be generated by the IKE protocol.
In order to fulfill this requirement, some research was done to learn how pregenerated/pre-shared keys could be used in an IPsec environment. First using the
automatic rekeying mechanism, IKE, in IPsec would not make any sense because IKE
has a set of message handshakes that use a Diffie Helman approach to generate the
session keys on the fly. An approach that would be valuable future research is the
development of a pre-shared/pre-generated keying software that could be used in
conjunction with the IPsec software. The pre-generated keys could be located at the
mission control ground station and onboard the space based vehicle, via a key store. The
software would then allow the negotiation of keys within that key store with special
considerations that involve the space conditions. NASA could use this software alongside
the IPsec protocol to successfully deploy a secure means of communications in space.
A. Balasubramanian [9] presents a theory for secure key management for NASA
space communications. The paper presents a key management solution that takes into
account the requirements and constraints of the space based networks. The development
of a cryptographic solution using a hybrid symmetric/asymmetric key generation that can
provide confidentiality and strong authentication is presented. The paper can provide
research ideas that can fulfill the requirements of building automatic key management
system for IPsec keys. M. Pajevski [8] discusses some changes that could be required
before IPsec would space ready and describes that managing IPsec devices in space can
be a complicated because of the lack of control over the IPsec software.
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Secondly, R. Housley [19] states that using AES-GCM securely can be extremely
difficult when using statically configured keys. The reuse of an AES-GCM nonce and
key combination destroys the security guarantees that AES-GCM will produce. The RFC
recommends using an automated key management platform to safely secure the keys used
by AES-GCM. NASA must take this security vulnerability of AES-GCM and make it a
requirement of the open source IPsec software and/or the customized key management
software that was described above.
More research must be done in order to complete evaluation of the Strongswan
open source IPsec software and develop a testing environment that would be able to
simulate a space link to Mars. If NASA wants to use IPsec on its future rover missions to
Mars and deploy IPsec to deep space satellites then a suitable testing environment must
be designed to test the IPsec software under these network constraints.
Lastly the Strongswan open source software must be checked for security
vulnerabilities and software bugs. The Strongswan software will first have to be certified
and approved for space systems by the National Security Agency or National Institute of
Standards and Technology [8]. Once the implementation is validated, then NASA must
test the software under space conditions and provide approval for the use of IPsec
communications in any manned or unmanned space missions.
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APPENDIX A
PACKET GENERATOR PROGRAM
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A.1

Packet Generator Program
This section of the Appendix will discuss the packet generator program that was

used throughout the experiments to create network traffic that would be encapsulated by
IPsec ESP packets, which provide encryption and authentication of the data being
transferred. This section will show some snippets from the actual code used by the packet
generator program and discuss how the code works to print out network statistics, such as
RTT Delay and number of packets.
A.1.1

Packet Generator Statistics
The packet generator is a relatively simple socket program written in the C

programming language and compiled on a Linux Fedora 14 operating system. The
program employs some client side code that reads a file provided by the user via
command line arguments. The client reads 1500 Byte segments of the file and packages
them in a TCP or UDP packet and sends them to the server side.
The server side of the socket code waits until there is a packet arriving from the
client. Once the 1500 Byte packet arrives at the server, the server then sends a 64 Byte
packet back to the client side of the program. The client uses the sending receiving
packets events to time the network statistics. Figure A.1 shows a snippet from the client
side code.
The code first reads 1500 Bytes from the file, then creates the start_RTT
timestamp and sends the 1500 TCP packet. Then the code waits for the response packet
from the server. When the packet arrives, the code reads the packet and then creates the
end_RTT timestamp (in the else statement below the recv command). The program then
calculates the differences between the timestamps to get the actual RTT calculation. The
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RTT value is then put into a running total of the RTT values. This also shows that the
client side code is keeping a running total of the number of packets that have been sent by
using the num_packets variable.

Figure A.1

Code Snippet of RTT Calculation

After the program reaches the end of the file that it is reading, the program can
stop and print out the statistics of the program. The program keeps a running total on the
number of packets sent, the sum of all the RTT calculations, and how long the program
took to send the file. All these statistics are printed out when the program is finished
reading the file. Figure A.2 shows a code snippet of the program printing out all the
statistics.
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Figure A.2

Code Snippet of Program Statistics

Figure A.2 shows all the statistics that are printed out by the packet generator
program on the client side. To calculate the Average RTT, the program divides the sum
of all the RTT values collected, while sending and receiving packets, by the number of
packets sent by the program. A program timer is started at the beginning of the program
and ended when the program finishes reading the entire file. The program uses these
timestamps to print out the amount of time taken to run the packet generator program.
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